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Political Challenges Behind the
Implementation of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child
'Michael Southwickt
I hope to offer some insights into the politics, diplomacy, and policy
choices involved in a government addressing the issue of child soldiers. To
do this, I would like to review some history and then discuss the develop-
ment of the U.S. position and the U.S. approach to the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
As is often the case, the larger problem involved in solving big
problems is political will. How do you gain the support of whole nations
or international organizations? How do you obtain and follow up on politi-
cal commitments? My account today is from the perspective of a U.S. dip-
lomat. For five years I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the
International Organizations Bureau of the Department of State. Before
that, I spent much of my career in Africa.
Here at this conference we have talked a lot about Sierra Leone, but
the African country I want to talk about is my favorite failed state, Somalia.
A few years ago, Somalia was front-page news. It was above the fold; it was
the lead item on the evening news. It drew the attention of the news media
because of the horrible drought, the terrible refugee camps, the plight of
the many starving people, and the use of child combatants. Through
global news channels such as CNN and BBC, the American public and the
international community all learned about the situation in Somalia. Dur-
ing this time, I was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in
neighboring Nairobi, Kenya. Kenya had long been regarded as a kind of
paradise in Africa. It was not a perfect place, but compared to Somalia it
seemed like a wonderful country. We at the embassy knew that the pres-
sure to take action to alleviate the suffering in Somalia was building in the
United States.
During that period, I hosted many visitors from the State Department,
the CIA, the Pentagon, Congress, and various international organizations.
They all asked the same question: What should be done about Somalia? I
gathered the best local Somalia experts. They all said essentially the same
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thing to visitors: "Don't intervene militarily. Take any nonmilitary mea-
sures that might help, but don't intervene militarily."
Deciding that something had to be done, the United States launched a
humanitarian operation using military assets, which the UN soon sanc-
tioned. As the operation evolved over the following months, however, it
became apparent that we would have to subdue, if not physically get rid of,
Somali faction leaders who were frustrating the humanitarian and political
reconstruction efforts. In Nairobi, we had a high-profile American ambas-
sador at the time, a somewhat Hemingwayesque figure named Smith
Hempstone. He had not been in favor of intervening in Somalia, and he
wrote a cable to Washington on the eve of the U.S. intervention that was
leaked to the press and that I frequently cite because it has some relevance
to the situation today. It was entitled, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love
Mogadishu." In the cable, Hempstone posed several questions: What is the
job that we are trying to do? Is it a worthwhile job or is it something that
we feel is necessary? What is the cost? He put that last question in brutal
terms. He asked, "What is the butcher's bill to do this job? And if there is
a butcher's bill, maybe we should think about another way to do it."
Most of you in this room have seen the movie Black Hawk Down. This
was the seminal event in the Somalia intervention. We lost eighteen
soldiers in one day. Naked and dead American soldiers were dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu, while international media channels
reported it all. The public reaction in the United States was one of over-
whelming disgust. Within six months, all the American soldiers in
Somalia were gone, from a peak of about 28,000 soldiers to zero, all as a
result of that single event.
A few months after the Black Hawk incident, I had lunch with a very
prominent African-American at the Terrace Restaurant in the Norfolk Hotel
in Nairobi. I told this visitor that it was a shame that this incident had
happened, because there was still a lot of work to do in Somalia. I con-
cluded: "We need to stay engaged." This person quickly replied, and I par-
aphrase: "Look: Those people were starving. We fed them. They killed our
soldiers. To hell with them." I believe the visitor was repeating the views of
many Americans at that time. Somalia turned off a whole generation of
Americans from the idea of intervention and nation-building.
The Rwandan genocide erupted shortly thereafter. I was still in Nai-
robi at the time, but I knew Rwanda well because I had served in Rwanda
earlier in my career. As I considered the Rwandan situation, there was not
a doubt in my mind that we would intervene, no matter how terrible the
situation became. The Somalia intervention, symbolized by the Black
Hawk incident, had made it politically impossible.
More lasting than the immediate impact on Rwanda was the effect on
perceptions of nation-building and the efficacy of intervention. Can we
rebuild nations or solve complex problems in other nations? In the last
presidential campaign, this was an issue. The successful candidate clearly
opposed getting involved in nation-building, though this attitude later
changed.
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Somalia, Rwanda, and some of the other turbulent events of the nine-
ties caused people to focus more on the child soldiering issue. Events
mobilized public opinion. The issue is vivid and compelling. The pictures
of child soldiers seen by the public worldwide show unimaginable and ter-
rible things.
For a number of years, the nongovernmental organization ("NGO")
community had expressed the belief that an optional protocol to the Chil-
dren's Convention on children in armed conflict would help combat child
soldiering. By this time, I was back in Washington, assigned to the Interna-
tional Organizations Bureau in the State Department of the Clinton Admin-
istration. There were competing values, among them the general revulsion
against nation-building, and the distaste of many conservatives for treaties.
In particular, Senator Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, belonged to a group of conservatives who believed that, by and
large, treaties simply do not do any good and in fact sometimes do harm.
It did not help that this particular treaty, as it was being proposed and
pushed by the NGO community and to a certain extent by the interna-
tional community, would have changed the way the U.S. military did busi-
ness. The military is sacred in American society. It may not have been
during the Vietnam War, but it certainly is now. Political leaders, includ-
ing former President Clinton, hesitated to tell the Pentagon that it had to
change the way it did business. I am referring to the "straight-eighteen"
position of the NGO community. Bear in mind that the Convention on the
Rights of the Child defines a child as any person under the age of eighteen.
The human rights community wanted to bar anyone under eighteen from
military service. However, the U.S. military recruits voluntarily, with
parental consent, at age seventeen, and has done so for as long as anyone
can remember. We have to do this these days in order to have a volunteer
army instead of a conscripted army to meet desired force levels. We need
to recruit when people leave high school, and many people leave high
school at seventeen. If we did not recruit seventeen-year-olds, they would
drift off to other activities. The U.S. military regarded a trained seventeen-
year-old as a full-fledged soldier suitable for deployment.
By late 1999, the negotiations on the child soldier protocol had been
in progress for about five years. In January 2000, another negotiating ses-
sion was scheduled in what many thought would be a final attempt to try
to reach an agreement. I was responsible for this negotiation. As the Janu-
ary session approached, a group of people at the State Department, the
National Security Council, and at the Pentagon jointly decided that the
United States needed to make the best effort possible in the negotiations.
We were not confident of success because we knew that recruiting volunta-
rily at seventeen simply could not and should not be changed, though we
thought the Pentagon might be persuaded to limit participation in hostili-
ties by soldiers who had not yet reached age eighteen. Aside from the mer-
its of a child soldier protocol, we were motivated to try to end the isolation
of the United States with regard to international treaties. In the previous
two years, the United States did not become a part of the International
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Criminal Court Treaty and the Land Mines Treaty. We did not want to
have strike three. We wanted the United States to be a party to interna-
tional treaties on subjects about which we cared. We did a lot of research
about what countries' recruitment practices actually were. We prepared a
carefully worked out alternative text for the protocol that took care of our
own interests with regard to the eighteen issue while clearly targeting the
actual offenders, mainly non-state actors in developing countries.
In the meantime, I was working in all the ways that I could to get the
Pentagon to change its views and to give us some flexibility on the eighteen
issue. You might think that in the United States, the President of the
United States, as the Commander-in-Chief, had but to tell the Pentagon:
"We're not going to deploy seventeen-year-olds. We can recruit at seven-
teen, but we're not going to deploy them. We're not going to have them
taking a direct part in hostilities." Unfortunately, it does not work that
way. The military is sacred, and President Clinton did not exactly have the
easiest, most comfortable relationship with the military establishment. So,
we had to try another approach. About halfway through the negotiations,
the Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor Samuel Berger
agreed that the Pentagon would alter its position. That change would allow
the United States to accept language that had been put forward two years
earlier on the question of deployment: that the government would take "all
feasible measures" to prevent the participation of seventeen-year-olds in
hostilities.
However, halfway through the negotiations in Geneva, we found that
this change no longer seemed sufficient. It should be borne in mind that
this was not the unilateral Bush administration; this was the Clinton
Administration. President Clinton was quite well-regarded by the interna-
tional community. Hostility generated by unilateralism and the neocon-
servatives did not exist at the time. Nonetheless, there were some people,
including some of our friends and NATO allies, who simply wanted to
make life difficult for the United States. They also felt that it was better to
have a purist position than to have the United States on board. They were
willing to take this hard-line position, even though it would mean a treaty
to which the United States would not become a party. We had to use a lot
of diplomatic muscle to overcome this sentiment, and we finally did, much
to the surprise of everybody, especially some people in the White House
and in our own delegation. The "all feasible measures" formulation was
accepted. Our negotiating team felt very good about this. We even had the
good fortune of getting President Clinton to sign the treaty in New York on
July 5, 2000.
Then there was an election and a new president. Some of the people
from Senator Helms's staff, who really did not like that treaty, showed up
in the Pentagon, advising the Secretary of Defense on these matters. We
had to mount an operation within the State Department and within the
White House to try to convince the Bush Administration to stay on course
with this treaty. Frankly, this was not as hard as some people thought it
would be. Once the Bush Administration-the President in particular-
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embraced the treaty, resistance fell. Even Senator Helms, who generally
did not like treaties, was willing to allow it to go forward. By the end of
2002, we ratified and acceded to it.
In internal U.S. government discussions about whether or not to
accede to the treaty, we had talked extensively about many of the funda-
mental issues concerning child soldiers. The United States's use of seven-
teen-year-old volunteers was not really the issue. Rather, the issue was the
use of far younger child soldiers in Sierra Leone, Uganda, and other such
countries. Why didn't the international community, the human rights
community, and the activist community talk seriously about this problem
instead of using this treaty negotiation as an opportunity to attack the
United States? This still puzzles me.
As I told Senator Helms at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
ratification hearing, the treaty is not a magic wand, but it will help. It will
end the debate about age eighteen and create a strong new international
standard. The treaty should also foster cooperation on practical steps to
deal with child soldiers, especially their rehabilitation and reintegration
into society. Of course, new issues have also arisen concerning the imple-
mentation of the treaty such as the role of the Security Council in enforc-
ing the treaty and the need for improved reporting and for more personal
involvement of the Secretary-General.
For its part, the United States has campaigned diplomatically to get
countries to ratify this treaty. We have asked our ambassadors stationed in
countries where there are child soldiers to work with host governments and
our allies to try to get these governments to implement strategies to ratify
and implement the treaty. Obviously, much work needs to be done. How-
ever, I think cooperating with other countries, European countries in par-
ticular, is going to make a difference.
We have heard that implementation of the treaty is not going well.
This tends to vindicate criticism made during the ratification process
about the efficacy of treaties. The persistence of child soldiering is very
troublesome to me. I was an ambassador in Uganda. When I left Uganda
in 1997, I thought that surely the problem involving the rebel Lord's Resis-
tance Army and its many abuses, including child abductions and the use of
child soldiers, would be solved in a few years. Seven years later, the situa-
tion in Northern Uganda is probably worse than ever. On the other hand,
worldwide, there have been significant improvements in the approaches
and programs that focus on rehabilitating child soldiers and reintegrating
them into society.
I attended a conference on peace-keeping a couple of months ago in
Ankara, Turkey, where two of the speakers were Turkish generals who had
commanded peacekeeping forces, one who was in Somalia in the early
nineties, the other who more recently commanded NATO forces in Afghani-
stan. They spoke at different times in the conference and did not appear to
have had time to compare notes beforehand. The general in Somalia basi-
cally said that everything that could go wrong did go wrong. The Afghani-
stan operation was much smoother. It wasn't perfect, but a lot of the kinks
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had been worked out. Reportedly, in Afghanistan there has also been a
greater effort in peacekeeping operations to address the needs of war-
affected children, including child soldiers, from the beginning of the
peacekeeping effort. It gratified me that the state of the art on peacekeep-
ing was advancing.
Like others here, I am worried about Iraq and how Iraq is going to
influence public attitudes toward humanitarian intervention. Frankly, the
situation in Iraq reminds me of Somalia. While we did not go into Iraq for
humanitarian reasons, Iraq has evolved into a humanitarian and nation-
building operation. The United States is again involved in a major effort
overseas to promote democracy and greater respect for human rights.
But the memory of Somalia is still with me. We left Somalia in sham-
bles, and it has stayed in shambles. That said, just in the last few months,
there has been some indication that the Somalis might be able to come to
an agreement that would put a national government in place.
How are we going to leave Iraq? Will Americans have any appetite for
foreign intervention in the wake of Iraq? Will it affect our engagement as a
nation in a whole host of international issues, not only child soldiers, but
war, economic development, and poverty? We have experienced donor
fatigue and disaster fatigue. Intervention fatigue may be setting in again.
Where is that going to leave us?
Fortunately, the situation is getting slightly better in Africa. The big
struggles that have generated a lot of child soldiers are coming to an end.
There is a peace agreement in Congo, and there is likely to be one in Sudan
in the near future. In Liberia there is a UN peacekeeping force that is grad-
ually spreading out throughout the country. C6te d'Ivoire will soon, we
hope, have some kind of Security Council resolution that will improve the
situation there.
Perhaps the worst is over in Africa. Whatever happens, however, I
believe there is always going to be an activist community to address remain-
ing problems. There will always be people who, regardless of what else is
happening in the world, will work hard with slim resources and often
against much opposition. However, to be truly effective in solving massive
problems, you need strong collective will and resolve. From time to time
we have exhibited such will as a nation and as an international community.
It will be interesting to see in the coming months whether we can muster
the collective will necessary to deal with current challenges.
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